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Abstract
This paper is about allocation of an infinitely divisible good to several ratio-
nal and strategic agents. The allocation is done by a social planner who has
limited information because the agents’ valuation functions are taken to be
private information known only to the respective agents. We allow only a
scalar signal, called a bid, from each agent to the social planner. Yang and
Hajek [25] and Johari and Tsitsiklis [16] proposed a scalar strategy Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (SSVCG) mechanism with efficient Nash equilibria. We con-
sider a setting where the social planner desires minimal budget surplus.
Example situations include fair sharing of Internet resources and auctioning
of certain public goods where revenue maximization is not a consideration.
Under the SSVCG framework, we propose a mechanism that is efficient and
comes close to budget balance by returning much of the payments back to the
agents in the form of rebates. We identify a design criterion for almost budget
balance, impose feasibility and voluntary participation constraints, simplify
the constraints, and arrive at a convex optimization problem to identify the
parameters of the rebate functions. The convex optimization problem has a
linear objective function and a continuum of linear constraints. We propose
a solution method that involves a finite number of constraints, and identify
the number of samples sufficient for a good approximation.
Keywords:
Auctions/bidding, Game theory, Economics, Linear Programming,
Uncertain Convex Program.
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: thirumulanathan@gmail.com (D. Thirumulanathan),
vinayhebbatam@gmail.com (H. Vinay), skrishna@ee.iitm.ac.in (Srikrishna
Bhashyam), rajeshs@ece.iisc.ernet.in (Rajesh Sundaresan)
Preprint submitted to European Journal of Operational Research May 5, 2017
ar
X
iv
:1
61
0.
06
73
4v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  4
 M
ay
 20
17
1. Introduction
This paper is about allocation of an infinitely divisible good to several
strategic agents. The social planner who does this allocation has limited
information in the sense that the agents’ valuation functions are taken to be
private information known only to the respective agents. We allow only a
scalar signal from the agents to the social planner, which we call a bid. This
is the only means by which agents can provide information about their valu-
ation functions to the social planner. We are interested in an efficient mech-
anism: the allocation should maximize the sum of valuations of the agents.
Under these constraints, we study mechanisms that come close to budget
balance. Example situations described next, include fair sharing of Inter-
net resources, disbursal of funds by a parent department, and auctioning of
certain public goods, where revenue maximization is not a consideration.
Example 1. A communication channel with total capacity C is to be
shared among several rational and strategic agents. This channel can be
allocated via a randomized allocation rule, and is thus an infinitely divis-
ible resource. If an agent gets a long term average throughput of ai, the
agent’s valuation is vi(ai), where vi : [0, C] → R+ is increasing, concave,
and known only to the agent. Naturally,
∑
i ai ≤ C. The agents wish
to share the resources among themselves without money transferred to an
external agent. Suppose that the agents agree to communicate with an ex-
ternal coordinator who attempts to maximize the sum of valuations. The
signal space complexity to signal the valuation functions to the coordinator
is prohibitive, particularly when the agents are geographically separated,
because the functions can be arbitrary within the infinite-dimensional class
of increasing concave functions. To model this communication constraint,
we assume that the agents can send only a scalar signal. In this example,
the coordinator is the social planner who desires efficient allocation without
an interest in maximizing revenue. The scalar signals are viewed as bids.
Example 2. A parent organization has to disburse available funds (as-
sumed divisible) among several of its departments. Each department has a
certain valuation function vi for the allocation, is strategic, and the parent
department desires to allocate efficiently while retaining only a minimal bal-
ance, if at all, based on limited information that the departments provide.
Consider the extremely limited information setting of a scalar signal. The
parent department is the social planner, the scalar signals are the bids, and
the parent department desires an efficient distribution and no surplus.
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey [24], Clarke [6],
Groves [8]) achieves efficient allocation, but only when the signal space is
sufficiently complex to describe entire valuation functions. In the VCG
mechanism, the social planner requests agents to submit their valuation
functions. The social planner then allocates to maximize the sum of the
submitted valuation functions and determines the agents’ payments.
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Motivated by the communication network context but with nonstrategic
agents, Kelly [18] proposed a mechanism that involved only scalar bids.
Under the Kelly mechanism, the social planner first collects scalar bids from
the agents. Then the social planner allocates the good in proportion to the
bids, and collects payments equal to the bids. The price per unit, or the
market clearing price, is the sum of the bids divided by the quantity of the
good. Every agent sees the same market clearing price. This distributed
solution was shown to be efficient under certain conditions, but the agents
should be price-taking or nonstrategic. If the agents are strategic, there is
an efficiency loss of up to, but not more than, 25% [15].
The VCG mechanism payments involve prices per unit good that can
differ across the agents. This is not the case in the Kelly mechanism. In
order to reduce the efficiency loss in strategic settings with scalar bids, Yang
and Hajek [25] and Johari and Tsitsiklis [16] brought the feature of price
differentiation across agents (a feature of the VCG mechanism) to the Kelly
mechanism. The resulting mechanism, a scalar strategy VCG mechanism1
(SSVCG), was shown to have efficient Nash equilibria.
All the above mechanisms typically result in a budget surplus (sum of
payments from agents is positive). In this paper, our ideal is to achieve
budget balance, or zero budget surplus. However, simultaneously achieving
efficiency and budget balance in a strategy-proof mechanism is, in general,
not possible (due to the Green-Laffont theorem [7]; see footnote 6).
In the VCG setting, where there is no constraint on signaling, various
almost budget balance notions and associated mechanisms were proposed.
Almost budget balance is achieved by redistributing the payments among
the agents in the form of rebates. Guo and Conitzer [11] and Moulin [20]
studied rebate design in the case of discrete goods. Gujar and Narahari
[9, 10] studied rebate design for the allocation of m heterogeneous discrete
goods among n agents. Chorppath et al. [5] studied rebate design in the
divisible goods setting.
A big advantage with the VCG setting is that the social planner comes
to know the true valuation functions. Voluntary participation of agents, i.e.,
agents being better off by participating in the mechanism, is easily verified.
Furthermore, knowledge of the valuation functions could be exploited in
defining a criterion for almost budget balance, as is done in Moulin [20] and
Chorppath et al. [5]. The extension of the almost budget balance notion to
the SSVCG setting, however, is not straightforward. We cannot assume that
the valuation functions are available because agents supply only a scalar bid.
1For some examples of mechanism design with restricted signaling, see Reichelstein and
Reiter [21] (minimal strategy space dimension for fully efficient Nash equilibria), Semret
[22] (two-dimensional bids for each resource), Jain and Walrand [14] (two-dimensional
bids on bundles of resources), Blumrosen et al. [1] (number of bits needed for signaling
the bid). Our focus however is on the one-dimensional signaling.
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We thus relax our objective to that of achieving Nash equilibrium instead of
achieving the DSIC (Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility) property.
In this paper, we consider the SSVCG setting that allows the agents to
send only a scalar bid. We (1) propose a notion of almost budget balance
appropriate for the SSVCG setting, and (2) design an optimal mechanism
as per the proposed notion of almost budget balance.
Kakhbod and Teneketzis [17] designed a mechanism to achieve an ef-
ficient Nash equilibrium with no budget surplus, but considered a setting
where the agents signal a two-dimensional bid to the social planner. More-
over, their mechanism may not be feasible when the signals of the agents are
not at Nash equilibrium. Sinha and Anastasopoulos [23] modified this mech-
anism to have feasibility even under off-equilibrium situations, but required
agents to signal a four-dimensional bid to achieve strong budget balance at
equilibrium. We are not aware of any mechanism that achieves an efficient
Nash equilibrium with strong budget balance using only scalar bids.
There are several design choices that we will make in arriving at a cri-
terion for almost budget balance in the SSVCG setting. Considerations of
tractability and significant reduction in surplus will guide our design deci-
sions. For example, we restrict attention to the so-called linear rebates. This
is mainly because it makes the optimization problem analytically tractable.
An additional reason for the choice of linear rebates is that they are known
to be optimal in the homogeneous discrete goods setting of Moulin [20] and
Guo and Conitzer [11]. The best justification however is the significant
reduction in the surplus seen in our simulation results.
The coefficients of the linear rebate functions will be determined by a
solution to a convex optimization problem. Specifically, we need to solve
an uncertain convex program (UCP) [2] involving a linear objective func-
tion and a continuum of linear constraints. We propose a solution method
that involves a finite number of constraints, and provide guarantees on the
number of samples needed for a good approximation. We first prove that,
under some sufficient conditions, the solutions of a general UCP and its cor-
responding relaxed UCP are close. We then prove that the specific linear
rebate UCP satisfies these sufficient conditions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
the problem setting and the SSVCG mechanism. In Section 3, we discuss
design choices for almost budget balance and rebate functions, our design
decisions, and formulate an optimization problem. In Section 4, we make
crucial reductions that ensure that our proposal can be implemented. The
resulting optimization problem is a UCP. In Section 5, we study a general
UCP and formulate a sufficient condition for an approximate solution via
sampling of constraints. In Section 6, we apply the solution of Section 5
to the UCP for almost budget balance. In Section 7, we summarize our
results, discuss alternative choices, and suggest possible extensions. Some
simulation results demonstrate the usefulness of our approach.
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2. The setting
2.1. SSVCG Mechanism
A social planner needs to allocate a unit divisible resource among n
intelligent, rational, and strategic agents. Agent i has a valuation function
vi : [0, 1] → R+ privately known only to herself. The interpretation is that
if ai ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the good allocated to agent i, her valuation is
vi(ai). The social planner’s goal is to solve the following problem:
max
{ai}
n∑
i=1
vi(ai) subject to
n∑
i=1
ai ≤ 1, and ai ≥ 0 ∀i. (1)
The social planner, however, does not know the valuation profile v1, . . . , vn.
To get some indication of these from the agents, the social planner chooses
the following mechanism with one-dimensional signals from the agents. The
social planner announces, a priori, a scalar-parametrized surrogate valuation
function set V = {v(·, θ), θ ∈ [0,∞)}. The function v(·, 0) is taken to be the
zero function. An agent i is asked to bid bi ∈ [0,∞), which is taken to
be a signal of that agent’s desired surrogate valuation function v(·, bi). All
agents bid simultaneously. The bid profile is denoted b = (b1, . . . , bn). If b
is the all-zero vector, the social planner allocates nothing. Otherwise, the
social planner allocates the divisible good by solving the following problem
which is naturally analogous to (1) but arising from the signaled surrogate
valuation functions:
max
{ai}
n∑
i=1
v(ai, bi) subject to
n∑
i=1
ai ≤ 1, and ai ≥ 0 ∀i. (2)
A payment pi(b) is then imposed on agent i. This payment is given by
pi(b) = −
∑
j 6=i
v(a∗j , bj) +
∑
j 6=i
v(a∗−i,j , bj)− ri(b−i), (3)
where the terms a∗j , a
∗
−i,j , and ri are as explained next. The term a
∗
j denotes
the jth coordinate of the optimal solution to the social planner problem in
(2). Its dependence on b is understood and suppressed. Similarly, a∗−i,j is
the jth component of the optimal allocation when agent i is not participat-
ing in the mechanism. Its dependence on b−i, the bids of all agents other
than agent i, is once again understood and suppressed. The function ri is
arbitrary and has as its argument the bids of all agents other than i. Agent
i’s resulting quasi-linear utility is vi(a
∗
i (b))− pi(b).
With the above specifications, we have a simultaneous action game (with
incomplete information) among the n agents. A schematic illustrating the
problem solved by the social planner, the utilities of the agents, and the
exchange of information is shown in Figure 1. Since each agent’s strategy
5
max
n∑
i=1
v(ai, bi)
Social planner
v2(a2)− p2(b)
Agent 2
b2 a2
v1(a1)− p1(b)
Agent 1
b1
a1
· · · vn(an)− pn(b)
Agent n
bn
an
Figure 1: Schematic representation of the SSVCG mechanism
is to choose a one-dimensional or scalar bid, and since the payments are
inspired by the VCG mechanism, this mechanism is called the scalar-strategy
VCG (SSVCG) mechanism2. The first two terms of the right-hand side of
(3) constitute the payment of agent i in Clarke’s pivotal mechanism, and
the last term ri(b−i) may be viewed as a rebate given to agent i.
The VCG mechanism satisfies DSIC; it is in the best interest of each
agent to signal her valuation function in its entirety. In our SSVCG setting,
however, the signal dimension is greatly reduced because only a scalar bid
is permitted. Incentive compatibility is not possible in general3, and we
shall settle for a Nash equilibrium. The following assumptions suffice to
guarantee the existence of, not just a Nash equilibrium, but an efficient
Nash equilibrium4 [16, Cor. 1], and furthermore, to assert that every Nash
equilibrium is efficient [16, Prop. 2].
Assumption 1. (a) For each i, vi is concave, strictly increasing, and
continuously differentiable5 on [0, 1], with vi(0) = 0. Moreover, at
least two agents have infinite marginal valuations at 0, that is, there
exist two agents i, j with i 6= j such that v′i(0) = v′j(0) =∞.
(b) For every θ > 0, the function v(·, θ) is strictly concave, strictly in-
creasing, and continuously differentiable over [0, 1], with v(0, θ) = 0
2Scalar-strategy Groves mechanism is perhaps more appropriate. We will stick to the
terminology of Johari and Tsitsiklis [16].
3Incentive compatibility is possible in some special settings. Consider the following
restricted VCG setting where, for simplicity, it is common knowledge that vi ∈ V for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, for each i, there is a θi such that vi(·) = v(·, θi). The private
information held by agent i is the scalar θi, and it can be seen that b = θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn)
is an equilibrium in dominant strategies.
4A Nash equilibrium is efficient if it yields an allocation that solves (1).
5The derivatives at the end-points are one-sided, with ∞ as a possible value at 0.
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for all θ ≥ 0. Furthermore, for any θ > 0, the derivative with respect
to the first argument satisfies v′(0, θ) =∞.
(c) For every γ > 0 and a > 0, there exists θ > 0 such that v′(a, θ) = γ.
Specifically, let us restrict the surrogate valuation function to be of the form
v(a, θ) = θU(a), where U : [0, 1]→ R satisfies the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. U is strictly concave, strictly increasing, and a continu-
ously differentiable function over [0, 1] with U(0) = 0 and U ′(0) =∞.
It is easy to verify that the surrogate valuation functions of the above form
satisfy Assumptions 1(b) and 1(c). The reason for this restriction is techni-
cal, and will be clear in Section 4.3.
2.2. Almost budget balanced SSVCG mechanism
When ri in (3) is identically zero, Clarke’s pivotal payment rule may
result in a net budget surplus (sum of payments) at the social planner. In
this paper, however, we are interested in scenarios where the social planner
wants efficient allocation, but desires zero budget surplus. Zero budget
surplus, also called budget balance, is unattainable in general6. Our objective
is to achieve almost budget balance, a notion we will formalize in this section.
Two properties are desired for these mechanisms after payments are
collected and rebates are redistributed as in (3). They are:
(F) Feasibility or weak budget balance: The mechanism should not be
subsidized by an external money source. This imposes the constraint
that, for each b, we should have
n∑
i=1
pi(b) ≥ 0,
which, using (3), is seen to be equivalent to
n∑
i=1
ri(b−i) ≤
n∑
i=1
−∑
j 6=i
v(a∗j , bj) +
∑
j 6=i
v(a∗−i,j , bj)

= −(n− 1)
n∑
j=1
v(a∗j , bj) +
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
v(a∗−i,j , bj)
=: pS(b), (4)
where pS(b) is the total surplus under Clarke’s pivotal payment rule.
6The Green-Laffont theorem [7] says that, when the set of valuation functions are
sufficiently rich, there is no quasi-linear mechanism that simultaneously satisfies DSIC,
allocative efficiency, and budget balance properties. Take the restricted VCG setting
in footnote 3. The Green-Laffont theorem is applicable to this setting, and since the
mechanism is DSIC and allocatively efficient, it follows that budget balance is impossible.
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(VP) Voluntary participation: Agents should be better-off (in the sense
of not being strictly worse-off) by participating in the mechanism. We
take the payoff (utility) for not participating in the mechanism to be
0. (VP) then imposes the constraint that, for each b, we should have
vi(a
∗
i )− pi(b) ≥ 0, ∀i, (5)
which, using (3) once again, is equivalent to
ri(b−i) ≥ −vi(a∗i )−
∑
j 6=i
v(a∗j , bj) +
∑
j 6=i
v(a∗−i,j , bj), ∀i
=: qi(b), (6)
where qi(b) is the negative of the quasi-linear utility of agent i under Clarke’s
payment rule.
An issue now arises. While the payments pi(b) do not depend explicitly
on the true valuation function, which is unknown to the social planner, the
condition for (VP) does. This can be seen in (6) by observing that qi(b)
depends on vi.
When ri(·) ≡ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, Clarke’s pivotal mechanism satisfies both
(F) and (VP). Are there other mechanisms with nontrivial rebate functions
that satisfy (F) and (VP)? We shall answer in the affirmative in Section 6,
and we shall see how the issue of dependence of (VP) on vi, which the social
planner does not know, is addressed in Section 4.1.
3. Design considerations leading to an optimization problem
3.1. Deterministic and anonymous rebates
For a given set of bids, we require that the rebates be deterministic: the
mechanism does not employ randomness. Additionally, we require that the
rebates be anonymous: two agents with identical bids should receive identi-
cal rebates. The information available to the social planner on the valuation
functions is symmetric across agents. Indeed, all that the social planner
knows is that the valuation functions satisfy Assumption 1(a). This infor-
mation is symmetric to permutation of agent labels. After the bids are sent
to the social planner, two agents with identical bids are indistinguishable,
and so, we require that the mechanism give them identical rebates.
To ensure deterministic and anonymous rebates, we restrict attention to
rebates of the following form. For a bid profile b, let b[j] be the j
th largest
entry of b. Similarly, for b−i, let (b−i)[j] be the jth largest entry of b−i. The
rebate functions are taken to be of the form7
ri(b−i) = g((b−i)[1], (b−i)[2], . . . , (b−i)[n−1]). (8)
In following subsections, we propose optimality criteria for designing rebates.
7This choice is motivated by the following observation. Consider the restricted VCG
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3.2. Design for the worst case
Suppose that there are m discrete and identical goods, and each agent
is allocated at most one good. The valuation function of agent i may be
taken to be θiai, where ai ∈ {0, 1}. The private information θi is then
interpreted as the value of the good to agent i. Clearly, this is a setting
where, with U(ai) = ai, the proposed mechanism is just the VCG mechanism
and achieves DSIC. We may therefore take the bids to be bi = θi for each
agent i. For this setting, Moulin [20] defined almost budget balance in terms
of the worst-case ratio of the sum of payments to the sum of valuations.
Specifically, Moulin’s proposal is to design rebates to minimize
sup
θ
[
pS(θ)−
∑n
i=1 ri(θ−i)
σ(θ)
]
, (9)
where σ(θ) =
∑n
i=1 v(a
∗
i , θi) is the optimal social welfare, subject to:
(F)
n∑
i=1
ri(θ−i) ≤ pS(θ) ∀θ, (10)
(VP) ri(θ−i) ≥ qi(θ) ∀i, ∀θ. (11)
See (4) and (6) for definitions of pS and qi, respectively. Guo and Conitzer
[11] considered an alternate proposal to minimize
sup
θ
[
1−
∑n
i=1 ri(θ−i)
pS(θ)
]
(12)
subject to the same (F) and (VP) constraints.
It turns out that in the above example of an auction of m identical
discrete goods, considered both by Moulin [20] and Guo and Conitzer [11],
the two proposals yield the same optimal rebates and objective function
values. In general, however, the two proposals yield different solutions.
Indeed, they yield different solutions for the auction of m identical discrete
goods if, for example, the (VP) constraint alone is relaxed. The Guo and
Conitzer proposal focuses only on the fraction of payment that is retained
setting of footnote 3 where a converse statement holds: if
sup
(a,θ)∈[0,1]2
∣∣∣∣∂v(a, θ)∂θ
∣∣∣∣ <∞, (7)
then any DSIC mechanism with a rebate function that is deterministic and anonymous
must have the form (8). This converse was informally stated by Cavallo [4], and formally
proved in [11, Lem. 2]. The proof relies on a result of Holmstro¨m [13] that shows that
any DSIC mechanism must be of the Groves class if the family of valuation functions
is ‘smoothly connected’. The latter property holds for our single-parameter family of
surrogate valuation functions when (7) holds.
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as net surplus without regard to the absolute value of the payment amounts.
A rewriting of Moulin’s objective (9) as
sup
θ
[
pS(θ)
σ(θ)
·
(
1−
∑n
i=1 ri(θ−i)
pS(θ)
)]
clearly shows that the fraction of retained surplus, the quantity considered
by Guo and Conitzer and enclosed within parentheses above, is weighted by
a factor that takes into account the size of the payments pS(θ) relative to
the optimal social welfare σ(θ). If the Guo and Conitzer proposal attains
its worst-case at a profile where the net Clarke surplus is small relative to
the optimal social welfare, it is de-emphasized by the Moulin proposal. The
Moulin proposal, therefore, focuses more on reducing the surplus in settings
where the net surplus is high relative to the optimal social welfare. We
therefore adopt Moulin’s proposal of minimizing (9).
Chorppath et al. [5] studied exactly this proposal in the divisible goods
setting, but in the simpler restricted VCG setting of footnote 3. While the
Moulin proposal is defensible for that setting, it has the drawback in our
SSVCG setting that σ(θ) is not known to the social planner. Just as we chose
a surrogate valuation function to identify the allocations and payments, we
choose a surrogate social welfare function
σS(b) :=
n∑
i=1
v(a∗i , bi) (13)
in place of σ(b). We therefore propose to minimize
sup
b
[
pS(b)−
∑n
i=1 ri(b−i)
σS(b)
]
(14)
subject to (F)
n∑
i=1
ri(b−i) ≤ pS(b) ∀b, (15)
(VP) ri(b−i) ≥ qi(b) ∀b, ∀i, (16)
where (15) is the same as (4), and (16) is the same as (6). This choice puts
us in the optimization framework of Chorppath et al. [5], except that we
have not yet shown how to resolve the issue of dependence of (16) on the
private information vi.
We now highlight two important differences between our work and that
of Yang and Hajek [25]. (1) For given valuation functions, they bound the
payments and revenues of the SSVCG mechanism, and remark that there
are suitable surrogate functions that can drive the revenue to zero. For a
given surrogate function, however, by merely scaling the (true) valuation
functions, the revenue can be made arbitrarily large. Thus their analysis
does not address the worst case setting while ours does. (2) Neither Yang
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and Hajek [25] nor Johari and Tsitsiklis [16] explicitly discuss or impose the
VP constraint, while we do. But, as we will point out after Lemma 3, the
SSVCG mechanism with Clarke’s pivotal payment rule does indeed satisfy
the VP constraint at Nash equilibrium if there is a bid, say 0, that signals
withdrawal from the mechanism.
3.3. Linear rebates
In the Moulin [20] and Guo and Conitzer [11] settings, which is that of
worst-case optimal rebates for the auction of discrete identical goods, linear
rebate functions of the form
ri(b−i) = c0 + c1(b−i)[1] + . . .+ cn−1(b−i)[n−1] (17)
were shown to be optimal. We too restrict attention to linear rebates of this
form. Optimality or otherwise of linear rebates for the divisible good case
is still unexplored. Linear rebates enable analytical tractability as we will
see in later sections. In Section 7, we present some numerical results that
justify to some extent the use of linear rebates.
3.4. Restriction to the closure of realizable signals
The performance metric (14) has a supremum over b subject to con-
straints (15) and (16) which are also parametrized by b. The supremum and
the constraints ought to reflect only those b that are realizable, i.e., those b
that are Nash equilibria for some valuation function profiles v1 . . . , vn. We
now identify this set of realizable points.
Lemma 1. Let the surrogate valuation function satisfy Assumptions 1(b)
and 1(c). Then, for any θ ∈ (0,∞)n, there exist valuation function profiles
v1, . . . , vn satisfying Assumption 1(a) such that b = θ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Proof is available in the online appendix. 
The form of the surrogate valuation function implies some regularity on
pS and σS .
Lemma 2. With v(a, θ) = θU(a), where U satisfies Assumption 2, the map-
pings b 7→ σS(b) and b 7→ pS(b) are Lipschitz continuous.
Proof. For σS , see Thm. 4 of Chorppath et al. [5]. For pS , see Lem. 1 of
[5]. The proofs are reproduced in the online appendix for completeness. 
Lemmas 1 and 2, and the fact that our choice of linear rebates is con-
tinuous in b, allow us to run b over the closure of the set of realizable (or
Nash equilibrium) bids. Since this closure is Rn+, b runs over all elements in
Rn+, both in the supremum and in the (F) and (VP) constraints.
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3.5. Ordering and the optimization problem
Observe that the worst-case optimality criterion (14) depends only on
the ordered bids. Without loss of generality, we henceforth assume that
agent i is the agent with the ith highest bid. Bids then come from the set
Θˆ = {b ∈ Rn+ | b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bn ≥ 0}, and the ith agent’s rebate is
ri(b−i) = c0 + c1b1 + . . .+ ci−1bi−1 + cibi+1 + . . .+ cn−1bn. (18)
Henceforth, when we refer to the optimization problem in (14) subject
to the (F) and (VP) constraints in (15) and (16), we replace the parameter
b by θ, and ∀b by ∀θ ∈ Θˆ. Let us also define c = (c0, . . . , cn−1).
The optimization problem to design the best linear rebate functions,
after substitution of (18) in (F) of (15) and in (VP) of (16), is now:
min
c
sup
θ∈Θˆ
[
pS(θ)−
∑n
i=1 ri(θ−i)
σS(θ)
]
(19)
subject to (F) nc0 +
n−1∑
i=1
ci(iθi+1 + (n− i)θi) ≤ pS(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θˆ (20)
(VP) c0 +
i−1∑
j=1
cjθj +
n−1∑
j=i
cjθj+1 ≥ qi(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θˆ, ∀i. (21)
4. Simplification of constraints and a reformulation
We now free up the optimization problem in (19) from its dependence
on the true valuation functions in the (VP) constraint. We also justify the
restriction of θ to a compact subset of Θˆ and arrive at a reformulation of
the above optimization problem as a generalized linear program.
4.1. Simplification of the (VP) constraints
As observed earlier, the (VP) constraint in (21) requires, through qi(θ),
knowledge of the true valuation functions. The following lemma is a signif-
icant step in freeing up the constraint from the knowledge of true valuation
functions, and assures us that the optimization problem is well-posed. Inci-
dentally, this will also establish that the SSVCG mechanism with Clarke’s
pivotal payment rule satisfies the VP constraint at Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the true valuations satisfy Assumption 1(a) and
that the surrogate valuation function is v(a, θ) = θU(a), with U satisfying
Assumption 2.
(1) The constraints (F) and (VP), (20) and (21), imply that c0 = c1 = 0.
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(2) Let c0 = c1 = 0. Then, the (VP) constraint is equivalent to
k∑
i=2
ci ≥ 0, for k = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1. (22)
Proof. Proof is available in the online appendix. 
Thanks to Lemma 3, the optimization problem is now given by:
min
c
sup
θ∈Θˆ
[
pS(θ)−
∑n
i=1 ri(θ−i)
σS(θ)
]
(23)
subject to (F)
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθi+1 + (n− i)θi) ≤ pS(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θˆ
(VP)
k∑
i=2
ci ≥ 0, k = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1.
4.2. Reformulation as a generalized linear program
As in Chorppath et al. [5], the min-max problem (23) can be turned into
a generalized linear program (LP) by introducing an auxiliary variable t:
min
c,t
t
subject to (F)
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθi+1 + (n− i)θi) ≤ pS(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θˆ
(VP)
k∑
i=2
ci ≥ 0, k = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1,
(W)
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθi+1 + (n− i)θi) + tσS(θ) ≥ pS(θ),∀θ ∈ Θˆ.
(W) captures the constraint associated with the worst-case objective.
We say “generalized” because the above LP has a continuum of linear
constraints parametrized by θ ∈ Θˆ. The constraint set on c and t is convex,
because it is an intersection of a family of half-plane constraints. While there
appears to be no direct way to solve this problem, further simplification of
the constraints is possible. We pursue this in the next subsection.
4.3. Simplification of (F) and (W)
In Appendix A we show two properties – monotonicity and scaling – of
the VCG payments. We shall now exploit them to simplify (F) and (W).
Observe that the left-hand side of (F) does not depend on θ1. From
Proposition 7(a), we have that pS(θ) is monotonically increasing in θ1 for a
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fixed θ−1. It follows that the right-hand side is smallest (and the constraint is
tightest) when θ1 = θ2. It therefore suffices to restrict attention to elements
of Θˆ that satisfy θ1 = θ2. Further, note that the constraint is automatically
satisfied if θ1 = θ2 = 0. So we may assume θ2 > 0.
Consider θ ∈ Θˆ such that θ1 = θ2 ≥ θ3 ≥ · · · ≥ θn, and θ2 > 0.
Define θˆ = θ/θ2; then θˆ ∈ Θˆ with 1 = θˆ1 = θˆ2. The left-hand side of
(F) is homogeneous of order 1 in θ. By our choice v(ai, θi) = θiU(ai), the
right-hand side of (F) is also homogeneous of order 1. As a consequence
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθi+1 + (n− i)θi) ≤ pS(θ)⇔ θ2
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθˆi+1 + (n− i)θˆi) ≤ pS(θ2 · θˆ)
⇔
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθˆi+1 + (n− i)θˆi) ≤ pS(θ2 · θˆ)
θ2
⇔
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθˆi+1 + (n− i)θˆi) ≤ pS(θˆ). (24)
(F) now simplifies, after removing the hats in θˆ, to
(F)
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθi+1 + (n− i)θi) ≤ pS(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θˆ, θ1 = θ2 = 1.
We now simplify the (W) constraint. First note that when θ1 = 0, (W)
is trivially satisfied since it is always the case that σS(θ) ≥ pS(θ). So we
may assume that θ1 > 0. We next note that the summation
∑n−1
i=2 ci(iθi+1 +
(n − i)θi), σS(θ), and pS(θ) are all homogeneous of order 1 in θ. Under
θ1 > 0, we can re-scale θ by its first component to get θˆ = θ/θ1, and obtain
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθi+1 + (n− i)θi) + tσS(θ) ≥ pS(θ)
⇔
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθˆi+1 + (n− i)θˆi) + tσS(θˆ) ≥ pS(θˆ). (25)
Thus the worst-case constraint (W) simplifies to
(W)
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθi+1 + (n− i)θi) + tσS(θ) ≥ pS(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θˆ, θ1 = 1.
We note that the simplification of constraints (F) and (W) was facilitated by
our assumption of the surrogate valuation function v(a, θ) = θU(a). These
simplifications, as we will observe in the proof of Theorem 6, enable us to
obtain a simpler solution to the optimization problem at hand.
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4.4. An uncertain convex program
Let us now define Θ = {θ ∈ Θˆ : 1 = θ1}. In view of the simplifications
of (F) and (W), we can now rewrite the optimization problem as
min
c,t
t (26)
subject to (F)
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθi+1 + (n− i)θi) ≤ pS(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ, θ2 = 1,
(VP)
k∑
i=2
ci ≥ 0, k = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1,
(W)
n−1∑
i=2
ci(iθi+1 + (n− i)θi) + tσS(θ) ≥ pS(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ.
This optimization problem continues to be a generalized LP with a
continuum of constraints. However, the continuum of constraints are now
parametrized by a compact set Θ instead of the non compact set Θˆ.
Chorppath et al. [5] studied the simpler VCG setting and adopted a
randomized approach to solving the optimization problem within a probably
approximately correct framework. Specifically, they considered a random
sampling of constraints from Θ and provided guarantees on the number
of samples required to obtain a near optimum solution. Here we take a
deterministic approach.
5. An uncertain convex program
The optimization in (26) can be cast as a convex optimization prob-
lem subject to convex constraints having an uncertainty parameter. Such
problems are called Uncertain Convex Programs (UCP). Formally, a UCP
is defined (in Calafiore and Campi [2]) as a convex program of the form
min
x
f(x) subject to x ∈ A and g(x,θ) ≤ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ, (27)
where θ is the uncertainty parameter, Θ is an n-dimensional set, x is a
d-dimensional variable over which optimization occurs, g(x,θ) is a convex
function of x for every θ ∈ Θ, and A is a convex subset of Rd. In general,
the index set for the constraints, Θ, may be a continuum and, hence, the
constraint set may be hard to characterize or compute.
The following three approaches to solve a UCP are known: robust op-
timization, chance-constrained optimization, and sampled convex program
(SCP) [see 2]. The first two techniques have been extensively studied under
some special settings while the third technique (SCP) appears to have a
wider applicability (see Calafiore and Campi [2, 3] for details). The SCP
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technique involves sampling a subset Θˆ(m) = {θ(1),θ(2), . . . ,θ(m)} in an in-
dependent and identically distributed fashion according to a distribution
PD, and relaxing the constraining parameters from ‘θ ∈ Θ’ to ‘θ ∈ Θˆ(m)’.
Formally, an SCP is of the form
min
x
f(x) subject to x ∈ A and {g(x,θ(i)) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m},
(28)
where θ(i) is the ith sample of the constraint parameter, and m is the number
of samples. Calafiore and Campi [3] provide the number of samples m suffi-
cient to make the sampled constraint set approximate the actual constraint
set in a particular sense as described next.
Theorem 4. [3] Let the violation probability V (x) at x be defined as V (x) =
PD(θ ∈ Θ : g(x,θ) > 0). Then, for a fixed , δ > 0, the number of samples
m(, δ) =
2

(
n log
(
2

)
+ log
(
1
δ
))
+ 2n
suffices for having Pr{V (x) ≤ } ≥ 1 − δ for each x that satisfies all the
constraints of the SCP.
In this paper, we want to bound the number of samples m(τ) needed to
make the values of the UCP and the SCP be within τ of each other, that is,
| Value of SCP−Value of UCP |≤ τ. (29)
Chorppath et al. [5], following Calafiore and Campi [3], studied a random
sampling of constraints and provided a bound on the number of samples
needed to satisfy (29) with high probability. Here we take a deterministic
approach. We first state and prove a more general result to bring out the
essential ideas. We then specialize it to the almost budget balance problem.
5.1. Solution to a general UCP
An ε-cover for Θ is a collection of points Θˆ(m) = {θ(1),θ(2), . . . ,θ(m)}
such that balls of radius ε centered around each of these points cover Θ. If
Θ is compact, there exists a finite cover.
Let X denote the constraint set of the UCP, and let Y denote the con-
straint set of the SCP obtained from an ε-cover. Symbolically,
X =
⋂
θ∈Θ
{x ∈ A : g(x,θ) ≤ 0} and Y =
⋂
θ∈Θˆ(m)
{x ∈ A : g(x,θ) ≤ 0}.
Since Θˆ(m) ⊂ Θ, we have X ⊂ Y. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.
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(a) The mapping x 7→ f(x) is Lipschitz on Y with Lipschitz constant K1.
(b) The mapping θ 7→ g(x,θ) is uniformly Lipschitz over x ∈ Y, with
Lipschitz constant K2.
(c) There is a constant K3 such that, for every y ∈ Y \ X, there exists a
θ ∈ Θ and an x ∈ X that satisfy g(y,θ) ≥ K−13 ||y − x||.
Our general result is the following.
Theorem 5. For the UCP (27) and the SCP (28) with Θˆ(m) being an ε-
cover for Θ, let Assumption 3 hold. Then the optimal values of the UCP
and the SCP are within K1K2K3ε of each other.
Proof. Let x∗ solve the UCP and let y∗ solve the SCP. Since X ⊂ Y, we
have f(x∗) ≥ f(y∗). We may assume that f(x∗) > f(y∗) (hence y∗ ∈ Y\X),
for otherwise, the theorem is trivially true.
By Assumption 3(c), for this y∗, there exist a θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ X, such that
g(y∗,θ) ≥ K−13 ‖y∗ − x‖. (30)
Clearly, we must have θ /∈ Θˆ(m), for otherwise, g(y∗,θ) ≤ 0, which contra-
dicts (30). Let θ∗ be the element in the ε-cover Θˆ(m) that is closest to θ.
We then have ||θ∗− θ|| ≤ ε, and since y∗ is a feasible point for the SCP, we
also have g(y∗,θ∗) ≤ 0. Thus
g(y∗,θ) ≤ g(y∗,θ)− g(y∗,θ∗)
(?)
≤ K2‖θ − θ∗‖ ≤ K2ε, (31)
where (?) follows from Assumption 3(b). Since x ∈ X, we must also have
f(x∗) ≤ f(x), and thus
f(y∗) ≤ f(x∗) ≤ f(x).
Subtracting f(y∗) throughout, we have,
0 ≤ f(x∗)− f(y∗) ≤ f(x)− f(y∗) ≤ K1‖y∗ − x‖, (32)
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 3(a). Putting the chain
of inequalities in (30), (31), and (32) together, we get |f(x∗) − f(y∗)| ≤
K1K2K3ε. 
6. An application to the problem of almost budget balance
The optimization problem in (26) can be cast as a UCP. Let us see how.
Define xi =
∑i
j=2 cj , i = 2, . . . , n− 1, and xn = t. (There is no x1). Let
x = (x2, . . . , xn−1, xn).
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(VP) now becomes xi ≥ 0, i = 2, . . . , n−1. The variable t is nonnegative,
and hence xn ≥ 0. Moreover, (W) is trivially satisfied for xn ≥ 1, when
xi ≥ 0, i = 2, . . . , n − 1. Therefore, restricting xn to be at most 1 has no
effect on the optimization problem since we minimize xn. Thus the set A
for the UCP is
A = {x | xn ≤ 1, xi ≥ 0, i = 2, . . . , n}.
We now write (F) and (W) in terms of the above-defined variables. To
do this, we define
αi(θ) = iθi+1 + (n− i)θi, i = 2, . . . , n− 1 (33)
αn(θ) = 0. (34)
Using c2 = x2 and ci = xi − xi−1 for i = 3, . . . , n − 1, the (F) constraint
then becomes
g1(x,θ) :=
n−1∑
i=2
xi(αi(θ)− αi+1(θ))− pS(θ) ≤ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Further, (W) becomes
g2(x,θ) := −
n−1∑
i=2
xi(αi(θ)− αi+1(θ)) + pS(θ)− xnσS(θ) ≤ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Now set g(x,θ) := max{g1(x,θ), g2(x,θ)}. We earlier argued that we could
restrict (F), g1(x,θ) ≤ 0, to those θ ∈ Θ that satisfy θ2 = 1. In order to
combine the two constraints into a single one, we allow other values of θ2,
θ2 ≤ 1, even though the constraints are tightest when θ2 = 1.
Finally, the objective function is taken to be f(x) = xn. The UCP in
(26) is then of the form (27) studied in the previous section.
We now have the following result.
Theorem 6. With Θ, A, f , g as defined above, the corresponding UCP
satisfies Assumption 3.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
By Theorems 5 and 6, using an ε-cover for Θ, the values of the UCP
for the almost budget balance problem in (26) and the associated SCP are
within K1K2K3ε of each other. The proof of Theorem 6 provides more
information on how the constants K1, K2, and K3 depend on n and U . The
proof, especially equations (B.3) and (B.7), requires σS(θ) and pS(θ) to be
lower bounded by a positive number. The simplifications in (F) and (W)
were needed to obtain these lower bounds.
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7. Discussion
7.1. Summary
We considered the allocation of a single divisible good among n agents
whose valuation functions are private information known only to the respec-
tive agents. The social planner announces (1) an allocation scheme and a
payment scheme that depend only on a scalar bid from each agent, and (2)
invites the agents to submit their bids. Allocations and payments utilize a
surrogate valuation function chosen (and announced beforehand) by the so-
cial planner (SSVCG). Rebates are used to achieve almost budget balance.
We provided a framework to design the rebates and to achieve almost budget
balance in a certain worst-case sense (19). Our framework involved a solu-
tion to a convex optimization problem with a continuum of constraints for
which we proposed a solution method involving constraint sampling. The
almost budget balance property and the implementability of the mechanism
holds off-equilibrium as well.
7.2. Performance of linear rebates
Linear rebates are known to be optimal in the homogeneous discrete
goods setting (Guo and Conitzer [12] and Moulin [20]). This was our main
motivation for studying linear rebate functions in this paper. While the op-
timality of linear rebates in our divisible goods setting is not yet established
in generality, we present some numerical results to highlight the reduction
in budget surplus using linear rebates.
For our simulations, we chose the surrogate valuation function v(ai, θi) =
θiU(ai). This form of surrogate valuations is popular in the computer
networking literature. (See Kelly [18] for an example.) This choice is 1-
homogeneous in the θi variable, a property which in conjunction with the
choice of linear rebates and the scaling property of VCG payments enabled
us to compactify the set of θ’s to Θ, the set of all ordered θ’s with θ1 = 1.
We chose U(a) = a1−α, α ∈ {0.01, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.99}. These U func-
tions are related to the generalized α-logarithm suggested by Yang and Ha-
jek [25]. In each case, the coefficients of the linear rebate functions were
obtained by solving the sampled convex problem (SCP). But instead of us-
ing an ε-cover, we used the ek profiles and 5000 × n additional randomly
sampled constraints8. The corresponding value of the SCP is denoted “Nu-
merical” value. An additional 50, 000 × n samples were generated, and the
performance of the identified rebate function on those 50, 000 × n samples
is denoted “Simulated” value. Since the rebates are determined only as an
approximate solution with the sampled constraints, the worst-case ratio in
the simulations, “Simulated” value, can be higher than “Numerical” value.
8θ2, . . . , θn were picked uniformly at random from [0,1] and were then sorted.
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For α = 0.5, Figure 2a shows “Simulated” and “Numerical” values and
compares them with the “SSVCG” value, the surplus under no rebates.
Figure 2b shows “Numerical” and “SSVCG” values for each value of α.
“Simulated” (not plotted) and “Numerical” values were close to each other
for each value of α, and both significantly lower than “SSVCG”. Moreover
the worst-case ratio reduces as the number of agents increases. In contrast,
the “SSVCG” value is nearly constant across the number of agents. Both of
these plots provide a compelling argument in favor of linear rebates.
Observe that the worst-case objective in the plots is scaled by a factor
of 1/(1−α). This is because the observed SSVCG value was at most 1−α.
This suggests (correctly) that we should set α very close to 1 to reduce
the worst-case objective. The reduction in the worst-case objective occurs
because of an increase in σS(θ) at the Nash equilibrium point corresponding
to each α, and not because of the reduced surplus. The reduced objective
function value is because of our choice of the Moulin objective function
which reweighs the fraction of surplus retained by a factor pS(θ)/σS(θ). The
surplus itself approaches a nonzero constant as the number of agents goes
to infinity. (Proofs of these assertions can be found in the online appendix.)
Interestingly, linear rebates continue to provide a significant reduction in
the budget surplus, as can be gleaned from Figure 2b. See Section 7.4 on
possible extensions for further remarks.
The following is a brief description of how |ci|, obtained from our simu-
lations, vary in i, n, and α.
• |c2| is found to be the highest among all |ci|. We did not observe any
other increasing or decreasing trend in the variable i.
• |ci(n)| monotonically decreases in n when i n. |ci(n)| did not show
any trend for i comparable to n.
• |c2(α)| was found to increase monotonically with α. |ci(α)| for all other
α was found to increase up to some α and then decrease thereafter.
We reiterate that these are mere observations from simulation outcomes and
are not formally established.
7.3. Optimality in expectation
In another work, Guo and Conitzer [12] considered a Bayesian setting
and an associated objective: minimize the ratio E[budget surplus]/E[VCG
payment without rebates]. Its extension to our setting involves a prior distri-
bution on the space of valuation function profiles. Suppose one can assume
that the Nash equilibrium associated with any valuation function profile is
unique – Yang and Hajek [25] identify some sufficient conditions for this to
hold. Then each valuation profile maps to a unique equilibrium bid profile.
The prior distribution on the space of valuation function profiles induces a
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: (a)(Worst-case objective t)/(1/2) vs. number of agents; v(a, θ) = θ
√
a.
(b) (Worst-case objective t)/(1 − α) vs. number of agents; v(a, θ) = θa1−α for α ∈
{0.01, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.99}. ‘Simulated’ (not plotted) was close to ‘Numerical’ in each
case.
distribution on the space of equilibrium bid profiles. Now, taking expecta-
tions of the budget surplus with and without rebates, we can arrive at an
objective function similar to that of Guo and Conitzer [12].
7.4. Possible extensions
As our choice of the almost budget balance criterion, we adopted the one
proposed by Moulin [20], see (14), for the reason highlighted in Section 3.2.
One could however work with the Guo and Conitzer [11] criterion, see (12),
and arrive at a new UCP. For this modified UCP, we do not have bounds
on the size of the ε-cover because Assumption 3(c) does not hold.
We focused here on anonymous rebates because we assumed that the
information with the social planner on the agents is symmetric to agent
permutation. If information on the agents is asymmetric, for example the
social planner wishes to weigh the allocation to one agent a little more than
that to another, then agent-specific Ui or agent-specific rebates could be
used. Anonymity will have to be relaxed.
We restricted our attention to the allocation of an infinitely divisible
good, and did not study a network setting, primarily because of our focus
on identifying a suitable notion of almost budget balance and our desire to
address the (VP) constraint’s dependence on the true valuations in a simple
setting. With our foundation, an extension to the network setting [25] or a
general convex setting [16] should now be possible.
While designing the rebate functions, we restricted attention to linear
rebates for analytical tractability. Linear rebates are optimal in the homo-
geneous discrete goods setting. Proving the optimality or sub-optimality of
linear rebates in our setting could be a direction for future work.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A. Monotonicity and scaling properties of VCG pay-
ments
We now prove monotonicity and scaling properties of the surplus under
Clarke’s payment rule, a result that may be of independent interest.
We consider a slightly more general setting than that of the paper. We
now allow the surrogate valuation function to possibly depend on the agent
and replace v by vi for agent i. We also relax the restriction that vi(ai, θi) =
θiU(ai), and make the following assumptions on the family vi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Assumption 4.
(a) For every i, every θi > 0, vi(·, θi) is strictly concave, strictly increas-
ing, continuously differentiable over [0, 1].
(b) For every ai ∈ [0, 1], the map θi 7→ vi(ai, θi) is absolutely continuous.
(c) For every ai ∈ [0, 1], the partial derivative ∂vi(ai,θi)∂θi exists.
(d) Furthermore, for some integrable Bi(θi), we have
∣∣∣∂vi(ai,θi)∂θi ∣∣∣ ≤ Bi(θi).
(e) For each fixed θi, the map ai 7→ ∂vi(ai,θi)∂θi is increasing.
(f) For each fixed ai, the map θi 7→ 1θi
∂vi(ai,θi)
∂ai
is decreasing.
Obviously, vi(ai, θi) = θiU(ai), where U is strictly concave, strictly in-
creasing, and continuously differentiable over [0, 1] satisfies Assumption 4.
The surplus under the Clarke’s payment rule is given by
pS(θ) = −(n− 1)
n∑
j=1
vj(a
∗
j , bj) +
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
vj(a
∗
−i,j , bj).
See also (4). The optimal social welfare is (see (13)):
σS(θ) =
n∑
i=1
vi(a
∗
i , θi).
The following shows the intuitive property that pS(θi,θ−i) is increasing in
θi.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 4, pS(θ) satisfies following properties.
(a) (Monotonicity) For fixed θ−i, the map θi 7→ pS(θi,θ−i) is increasing.
(b) (Scaling) For fixed θ, the map λ 7→ pS(λθ)/λ is decreasing.
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Proof. (a) Fix i. The proof uses the envelope theorem [see 19, Thm. 2].
Focus first on σS . By virtue of Assumption 4(b)-(d), for a fixed a and
θ−i, we have that θi 7→
∑n
k=1 vk(ak, θk) is absolutely continuous, has partial
derivative, and∣∣∣∣∣ ∂∂θi
(
n∑
k=1
vk(ak, θk)
)∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∂vi(ai, θi)∂θi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Bi(θi).
By [19, Thm. 2], σS(θ) has a partial derivative with respect to θi almost
everywhere on [0, 1] which equals
∂σS(θ)
∂θi
=
∂vi(a
∗
i (θ), θi)
∂θi
.
For each k 6= i, apply the same argument as given above to the envelope∑
j 6=k vj(a
∗
−k,j(θ−k), θj), to get
∂
∂θi
∑
j 6=k
vj(a
∗
−k,j(θ−k), θj)
 = ∂vi(a∗−k,i(θ−k), θi)
∂θi
.
For k = i, the corresponding envelope does not depend on θi. The above
considerations yield
∂pS(θ)
∂θi
=
∑
k 6=i
∂vi(a
∗
−k,i(θ−k), θi)
∂θi
− (n− 1)∂vi(a
∗
i (θ), θi)
∂θi
. (A.1)
It is easy to see (using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions) that
for each k, we have a∗−k,i(θ−k) ≥ a∗i (θ). Intuitively, if an agent k 6= i is out of
consideration, then the optimal amount allocated to agent i only increases.
Consequently, by Assumption 4(e), we have
∂vi(a
∗
−k,i(θ−k), θi)
∂θi
≥ ∂vi(a
∗
i (θ), θi)
∂θi
.
Using this in (A.1), we get ∂pS(θ)∂θi ≥ 0, i.e., pS(θ) is increasing in θi.
(b) Differentiating pS(λθ)/λ with respect to λ, we get
d
dλ
(
pS(λθ)
λ
)
=
λθT∇θpS(λθ)− pS(λθ)
λ2
.
It suffices to show that this is negative. Without loss of generality, we can
replace λθ by θ, and it suffices to check that θT∇θpS(θ) ≤ pS(θ). Using
the formula (A.1), this amounts to checking that
n∑
i=1
θi
∑
k 6=i
∂
∂θi
vi(a
∗
−k,i(θ−k), θi)− (n− 1)
∂
∂θi
vi(a
∗
i (θ), θi)

≤
n∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
vi(a
∗
−k,i(θ−k), θi)− (n− 1)vi(a∗i (θ), θi)
 .
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This holds if, for every i and every k 6= i,
θi
∂
∂θi
vi(a
∗
−k,i(θ−k), θi)−θi
∂
∂θi
vi(a
∗
i (θ), θi) ≤ vi(a∗−k,i(θ−k), θi)−vi(a∗i (θ), θi),
or equivalently
θi
∂
∂θi
vi(a
∗
−k,i(θ−k), θi)−vi(a∗−k,i(θ−k), θi) ≤ θi
∂
∂θi
vi(a
∗
i (θ), θi)−vi(a∗i (θ), θi).
But this follows from a∗−k,i(θ−k) ≥ a∗i (θ) and the fact that, for every θi,
ai 7→ θi ∂
∂θi
vi(ai, θi)− vi(ai, θi)
is decreasing, which is an easy consequence of Assumption 4(f). 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 6
We again restrict the surrogate valuation function v(a, θ) = θU(a), with
U satisfying Assumption 2. We now verify (a)-(c) of Assumption 3.
Assumption 3(a): Since f(x) = xn, this holds trivially with Lipschitz
constant K1 = 1.
Before we get to verifying the next assumption, we establish two lemmas.
Lemma 8. The coefficients of xi in the expression for g1 are nonnegative,
i.e., αi(θ) − αi+1(θ) ≥ 0 for i = 2, . . . , n − 1, where αi are defined in (33)
and (34).
Proof. For i = 2, . . . , n− 2, using (33), the coefficients of xi satisfy
αi(θ)− αi+1(θ) = i(θi+1 − θi+2) + (θi − θi+2) + (n− i− 1)(θi − θi+1) ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows because the θi are nonincreasing with index
i. Finally, the coefficient of xn−1 is simply αn−1(θ) which is nonnegative.
We next argue that the elements of X are bounded.
Lemma 9. If x ∈ X, then, for i = 2, . . . , n−1, we have 0 ≤ xi ≤ Bn, where
Bn := pS(en).
Proof. From (F) in (26), the nonnegativity of xi, and the nonnegativity
of the coefficients of xi in the expression for g1 established in Lemma 8, we
have that for each i = 2, . . . , n− 1,
xi ≤ pS(θ)
αi(θ)− αi+1(θ) , ∀θ ∈ Θ.
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Setting θ = ei, we get αi(θ) − αi+1(θ) = (n − i) − 0. Now, by using
monotonicity of pS (Proposition 7(a)), we get
xi ≤ pS(ei)
n− i ≤
pS(en)
n− i ≤ pS(en) = Bn.
Hence the result. 
We now continue with the proof that Assumption 3(b) holds.
Assumption 3(b): If g1(x, ·) and g2(x, ·) are both uniformly Lipschitz
with constants K ′2 and K ′′2 , then g(x, ·) = max{g1(x, ·), g2(x, ·)} is also uni-
formly Lipschitz with constant K2 = max{K ′2,K ′′2 }. The mappings g1(x, ·)
and g2(x, ·) are uniformly Lipschitz because of the following:
(i) θ 7→ σS(θ) is Lipschitz with constant U(1)
√
n;
(ii) θ 7→ pS(θ) is Lipschitz with constant 2U(1)n
√
n;
(iii) the mapping θ 7→∑n−1i=2 xi(αi(θ)− αi+1(θ)) is uniformly Lipschitz.
Items (i) and (ii) were established in Lemma 2. To see (iii), observe that∣∣αi(θ)− αi(θ′)∣∣ = ∣∣i(θi+1 − θ′i+1) + (n− i)(θi − θ′i)∣∣
≤ i||θ − θ′||+ (n− i)||θ − θ′|| = n||θ − θ′||.
Since this inequality holds for all i, and since xi ≤ Bn, we see that Item (iii)
holds with Lipschitz constant 2n2Bn. The Lipschitz constants K
′
2 and K
′′
2 ,
and hence K2, are as follows.
K ′2 = 2n
2Bn + 2U(1)n
√
n
K ′′2 = 2n
2Bn + 2U(1)n
√
n+ U(1)
√
n (from xn ≤ 1)
K2 = max{K ′2,K ′′2 } = K ′′2 .
Assumption 3(c): Define Xi = {x ∈ A | gi(x,θ) ≤ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ}, i = 1, 2.
Note that g1(x,θ) does not depend on the last component (the xn compo-
nent). Recall that Y is the constraint set for the SCP.
Let y = (y2, · · · , yn−1, yn) ∈ Y \ X. We consider two cases.
(i) Suppose y ∈ X1, but y /∈ X2.
Find the smallest t > yn such that x = (y2, . . . , yn−1, t) ∈ X2. Since the
first n− 2 components have not changed, x ∈ X1 as well, and so x ∈ X. We
now claim that there is a θ with g2(x,θ) = 0.
Suppose that the claim is false. Since θ 7→ g2(x,θ) is continuous, and
since Θ is compact, we have −ε := maxθ∈Θ g2(x,θ) < 0. By the linearity of
25
g2(.,θ), for any θ ∈ Θ, we have
g2
((
y2, . . . , yn−1, t− ε
nU(1)
)
,θ
)
= g2((y2, . . . , yn−1, t),θ) +
ε
nU(1)
σS(θ)
≤ g2(x,θ) + ε
nU(1)
σS(θ)
≤ −ε+ ε
nU(1)
σS(θ) ≤ 0,
where σS(θ) ≤ nU(1) since θi, ai ∈ [0, 1]∀i. Thus (y2, . . . , yn−1, t− εnU(1)) ∈
X2, and this contradicts the choice of t.
Using the claim, we have
g(y,θ) ≥ g2(y,θ) = g2(y,θ)− g2(x,θ) = (t− yn)σS(θ) = ||y − x||σS(θ)
≥ ||y − x||U(1). (B.1)
The last inequality holds because σS(θ) is the socially optimum value when
the reported bids are θ, and U(1) is the value obtained for a particular
allocation that gives the entire good to a single agent. In (B.1), we also
used ||y − x|| = t − yn because y and x differ only in the last component
and t > yn. Let K
′
3 = U(1). We will choose K
−1
3 lower than this after
considering other cases.
(ii) Suppose y /∈ X1.
Fix γ > n/U(1). We will choose this γ suitably later. Find the smallest
β > 0 such that
x(β) := [(y2 − β)+, . . . , (yn−1 − β)+,min(1, yn + γβ)] ∈ X,
where [·]+ indicates truncation from below by 0. Notice that the first n− 2
components decrease, but the last component increases. The procedure
clearly terminates because (0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ X, and this point will eventually
be reached for some β > 0.
We now have two subcases.
(ii-a): The path from y to x(β) first touches X2, say at x(β′) for 0 ≤
β′ ≤ β, before entering X.
Then x(β′′) ∈ X2 for all {β′′ ≥ β′ | yn + γβ′′ ≤ 1}. This is because for
all θ ∈ Θ, we have
g2(x(β
′),θ)− g2(x(β′′),θ)
= −
n−1∑
i=2
(xi(β
′)− xi(β′′))(αi(θ)− αi+1(θ))− γ(β′ − β′′)σS(θ)
≥ −(β′′ − β′)
n−1∑
i=2
(αi(θ)− αi+1(θ)) + γ(β′′ − β′)σS(θ), (B.2)
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where (B.2) follows from αi(θ) − αi+1(θ) ≥ 0 (Lemma 8) and xi(β′) −
xi(β
′′) ≤ β′′ − β′ for i = 2, 3, . . . , n − 1. Continuing, the right-hand side of
(B.2) equals
(β′′ − β′) [−(α2(θ)− αn(θ)) + γσS(θ)] = (β′′ − β′) [γσS(θ)− α2(θ)]
≥ (β′′ − β′) [γU(1)− n] (B.3)
≥ 0. (B.4)
In (B.3), we used σS(θ) ≥ U(1) and α2(θ) ≤ n. The latter follows because
α2(θ) = 2θ3 + (n − 2)θ2 ≤ 2 + n − 2 = n, since 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1 for all i. The
inequality (B.4) follows from the choice of γ.
In case β′′ ∈ [β′, β] but yn + γβ′′ > 1, then xn(β′′) = 1 and thus x(β′′) ∈
X2 is trivially true.
We claim that there exists a θ ∈ Θ with θ2 = 1 such that g1(x(β),θ) = 0.
Suppose that the claim is false. Since θ 7→ g1(x,θ) is continuous, and since
Θ is compact, we have −ε := max{θ∈Θ:θ2=1} g1(x,θ) < 0. By the linearity
of g1(.,θ), for any θ ∈ Θ with θ2 = 1, we have
g1
(
x
(
β − ε
n
)
,θ
)
≤ g1(x(β),θ) + ε
n
n−1∑
i=2
(αi(θ)− αi+1(θ))
≤ −ε+ ε
n
(α2(θ)− αn(θ)) ≤ 0, (B.5)
i.e., x
(
β − εn
) ∈ X1, and this contradicts the choice of β.
Now for this θ, which satisfies θ1 = θ2 = 1, by monotonicity of pS , we
have pS(θ) ≥ pS(e2) = 2U(1) − 2U(1/2) := B2 > 0. The strict positivity
follows because U is strictly increasing. We then have
g(y,θ) ≥ g1(y,θ) = g1(y,θ)− g1(x(β),θ)
=
n−1∑
i=2
(yi−xi(β))(αi(θ)−αi+1(θ)) ≥ β
n−1∑
i=2
(αi(θ)−αi+1(θ))1{xi(β) > 0}.
(B.6)
The last inequality follows because: if xi(β) > 0, the difference yi − xi(β) is
exactly β; if not, the corresponding term is ≥ 0 and thus can be dropped.
To lower bound this last term, we proceed as follows. Since pS(θ) ≥
pS(e2) = B2, and since g1(x(β),θ) = 0, we have
B2 ≤ pS(θ) =
n−1∑
i=2
xi(β)(αi(θ)− αi+1(θ)) (from g1(x(β),θ) = 0)
=
n−1∑
i=2
xi(β)(αi(θ)− αi+1(θ))1{xi(β) > 0}
≤ Bn
n−1∑
i=2
(αi(θ)− αi+1(θ))1{xi(β) > 0}, (B.7)
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where the last inequality follows from Lemma 9. Putting (B.6) and (B.7)
together, we get
g(y,θ) ≥ βB2/Bn. (B.8)
Define x∗(β) = y − β(1, . . . , 1,−γ). This is without the truncation from
below by 0. Clearly,
||y − x(β)|| ≤ ||y − x∗(β)|| = β||(1, . . . , 1,−γ)|| = β
√
n− 2 + γ2. (B.9)
Combining (B.8) and (B.9), we get
g(y,θ) ≥ B2
Bn
√
n− 2 + γ2 ||y − x(β)||. (B.10)
Take x = x(β) and take K ′′3 = B2/
(
Bn
√
n− 2 + γ2
)
.
(ii-b): The path from y to x(β) first touches X1, say at x(β′) for 0 <
β′ < β, before entering X.
Then x(β′′) ∈ X1 for all β′ ≤ β′′ ≤ β. This is because, once X1 is
reached, the first n − 2 components only decrease thereafter with β, and
therefore g1 also only decreases.
We now claim that there exists a θ ∈ Θ such that g2(x(β),θ) = 0.
Suppose that the claim is false. Since θ 7→ g2(x,θ) is continuous, and since
Θ is compact, we have −ε := maxθ∈Θ g2(x,θ) < 0. By the linearity of
g2(.,θ), for any θ ∈ Θ, we have
g2
(
x
(
β − ε
γnU(1)
)
,θ
)
≤ g2(x(β),θ) + ε
γnU(1)
γσS(θ)
≤ −ε+ ε
nU(1)
σS(θ) ≤ 0, (B.11)
where first inequality follows since the terms involving (x2(β), . . . , xn−1(β))
are nonpositive. Thus x
(
β − εγnU(1)
)
∈ X2, and this contradicts the choice
of β. We then have
g(y,θ) ≥ g2(y,θ) = g2(y,θ)− g2(x(β),θ)
≥ β(γU(1)− n) (B.12)
≥ (γU(1)− n)√
n− 2 + γ2 ||y − x(β)|| (B.13)
where (B.12) follows by tracing the same sequence of inequalities leading to
(B.3), with y and x(β) in place of x(β′) and x(β′′), respectively, and (B.13)
follows from (B.9). Observe that the same sequence of inequalities leading to
(B.3) can be traced since x(β) ∈ X the moment yn + γβ = 1, and thus yn +
γβ > 1 never occurs. Take x = x(β) and K ′′′3 = (γU(1)− n)/
√
n− 2 + γ2.
Setting K−13 = min{K ′3,K ′′3 ,K ′′′3 }, we see that Assumption 3-(c) holds.
Setting γ = (n + B2/Bn)/U(1), which exceeds n/U(1), we get K
−1
3 =
min
{
U(1), B2/
(
Bn
√
n− 2 + γ2
)}
. 
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Online Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Fix θ ∈ (0,∞)n. Suppose vi(ai) = v(ai, θi) ∀i. The valuation function
vi inherits the concavity, strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable
properties from v. All agents have infinite marginal utility at zero. As-
sumption 1(a) is thus clearly satisfied. Agent i does not know the valuation
functions of the other agents, but she realizes that there is a bid value that
will make her resulting utility (after payment) align with the function opti-
mized by the social planner, regardless of the others’ bids. Bidding bi = θi
is therefore optimal regardless of others’ bids. Since this is true for each
agent, θ is a Nash equilibrium profile for the indicated valuation profile. 
Proof of Lemma 2:
Without loss of generality, let σS(b) ≥ σS(b′). Let a and a′ be the
optimal allocations under bid profiles b and b′, respectively. Then
∑
i
v(ai, b
′
i) =
∑
i
b′iU(ai)
(?)
≤ σS(b′) ≤ σS(b) =
∑
i
biU(ai),
where (?) follows because σS(b
′) is the value under the optimal allocation
for b′, and so
|σS(b)− σS(b′)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
biU(ai)−
∑
i
b′iU(ai)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
(bi − b′i)U(ai)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ U(1)
∑
i
|bi − b′i| = U(1)‖b− b′‖1.
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives ‖b − b′‖1 ≤
√
n‖b − b′‖, in terms of
the Euclidean norm. This proves the Lipschitz property of the mapping
b 7→ σS(b) with constant U(1)
√
n.
Define σS,−i(b−i) =
∑
j:j 6=i v(a
∗
−i,j , bj). Clearly, σS,−i is also Lipschitz
with the same constant U(1)
√
n. For two bid profiles b and b′, applying the
definition of pS in (4), we get
|pS(b)− pS(b′)| ≤
∑
i
|σS,−i(b−i)− σS,−i(b′−i)|+ (n− 1)|σS(b)− σS(b′)|
≤ U(1)√n
[∑
i
||b−i − b′−i||+ (n− 1)||b− b′||
]
≤ (2U(1)n√n) ||b− b′||,
where the last inequality follows because ||b−i − b′−i|| ≤ ||b − b′|| for all i.
This proves the Lipschitz property of the mapping b 7→ pS(b) with constant
2U(1)n
√
n. 
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Proof of Lemma 3:
(1) We show that c0 = c1 = 0 by setting θ = e0 and θ = e1 in (F) and
(VP), where ek = (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with k 1’s. Setting θ = e0 in (F), we
get nc0 ≤ pS(e0) = 0. Setting θ = e0 in (VP) yields c0 ≥ −vi(a∗i ) ∀i. When
θ = e0, there is no allocation, a
∗
i = 0 for all i, and we get c0 ≥ −vi(0) = 0.
Hence c0 = 0.
Setting θ = e1 in (F), we get (n−1)c1 ≤ pS(e1) = 0. Setting θ = e1 and
i = 2 in the (VP) constraint, we get c1 ≥ q2(e1) = −v2(0) = 0. Therefore,
c1 = 0.
(2) We first show the forward implication. From (6), we know that
qk(ek−1) = 0, since vk(0) = 0 and v(·, 0) = 0. Thus, from (VP), we have
rk(ek−1) ≥ 0. Substituting k = 3, . . . , n, we obtain (22).
Now we show the reverse implication. Let θ ∈ Θˆ be a Nash equilibrium
for the valuation function profile v1, . . . , vn. From [11, Lem. 1], if
∑k
i=2 ci ≥
0 ∀k = 2, . . . , (n − 1), then c2b2 + . . . + ci−1bi−1 + cibi+1 + . . . + cn−1bn ≥
0 ∀b ∈ Θˆ, ∀i, i.e., ri(b−i) ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ Θˆ,∀i. Hence ri(θ−i) ≥ 0, ∀i. Now,
consider qi(θ):
−qi(θ) = vi(a∗i (θi,θ−i)) +
∑
j 6=i
v(a∗j (θi,θ−i), θj)−
∑
j 6=i
v(a∗−i,j(θ−i), θj)
≥ vi(a∗i (0,θ−i)) +
∑
j 6=i
v(a∗j (0,θ−i), θj)−
∑
j 6=i
v(a∗−i,j(θ−i), θj),
where the inequality holds because θi is the best response against θ−i (Nash
equilibrium); replacing θi by 0 should yield a lower value. Now, the right-
hand side of the inequality is zero because: (1) assumption v(a, 0) = 0
implies that a∗i (0,θ−i) = 0, and vi(0) = 0 implies that the first term
vi(a
∗
i (0,θ−i)) = 0, and (2) θi = 0 implies that presence of agent i does
not affect the outcome for the other agents, thereby resulting in the second
and third terms canceling each other. Therefore, we have qi(θ) ≤ 0. Since,
we already know ri(θ−i) ≥ 0, we have ri(θ−i) ≥ qi(θ). 
Remark 1. We put the bids ek, k = 0, 1, . . . , n to good use in the proof
above. Though some of these bids may not be realizable – for example, e0
and e1 are not realizable because our Assumption 1(a) forces at least two
nonzero bidders in any (efficient) Nash equilibrium – we may still use these
bids because they belong to the closure of the set of Nash equilibria. These
bids may be approached through a sequence of realizable bids.
Remark 2. Setting c = 0, we see that Clarke’s pivotal payments satisfy
(VP) even in the SSVCG setting with surrogate valuations, where vi’s are
not fully known to the social planner.
32
Addendum to Section 7.2:
Lemma 10. Consider v(a, θ) = θa1−α for some α ∈ (0, 1). Then the ex-
pression pS(θ)σS(θ) is maximized at θ = µen for any µ > 0.
Proof. Recall that the efficient allocation solves (2). From the KKT con-
ditions, the efficient allocation is ai = θ
1/α
i /
∑n
j=1 θ
1/α
j , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Sub-
stituting ai in σs(θ), we get σS(θ) = ‖θ‖ 1
α
. Here, ‖.‖p denotes the Lp-norm.
Thus we have pS(θ)/σS(θ) =
∑n
j=1 ‖θ−j‖ 1
α
/‖θ‖ 1
α
− (n − 1). To find the
maximizer, we differentiate this expression and equate it to zero, to get
∂
∂θi
(
pS(θ)
σS(θ)
)
=
θ
1−α
α
i
‖θ‖21
α
∑
j 6=i
‖θ‖ 1
α
‖θ−j‖
1−α
α
1
α
−
n∑
j=1
‖θ−j‖ 1
α
‖θ‖
1−α
α
1
α
 = 0. (B.14)
(B.14) is satisfied for all i if and only if θ = µen. This can be observed as
follows:
• (B.14) holds for all i if and only if the following quantity is a constant
for all i.
n∑
j=1
‖θ‖ 1
α
‖θ−j‖
1−α
α
1
α
−
‖θ‖ 1
α
‖θ−i‖
1−α
α
1
α
−
n∑
j=1
‖θ−j‖ 1
α
‖θ‖
1−α
α
1
α
.
• This occurs if and only if ‖θ‖ 1α
‖θ−i‖
1−α
α
1
α
is a constant for all i.
• This in turn occurs if and only if ‖θ−i‖ 1
α
is a constant for all i, which
in turn occurs if and only if θi is a constant for all i.
Thus (B.14) is satisfied for all i only when θ1 = . . . = θn = µ.
We now use second order condition to show that θ = µen is indeed the
maximizer. The entries of the Hessian matrix ∇2(pS(θ)/σS(θ)) at θ = µen
can be shown to be
(∇2(pS(µen)/σS(µen)))ij =
{
1
µ2
1−1/α
n1+α(n−1)1−α i = j
1
µ2
1/α−1
n1+α(n−1)2−α i 6= j.
The term θT
[∇2(pS(µen)/σS(µen))]θ equals 0 for every θ = {νen, ν ∈
R}, and is negative otherwise. This indicates that the function f(θ) =
pS(θ)/σ(θ) is strictly concave in every line passing through µen, except on
the line θ = {νen, ν ∈ R}, where it is a constant. Thus θ = µen maximizes
pS(θ)/σs(θ). 
The worst-case for SSVCG thus occurs at θ = µen. We now bound the
objective.
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Proposition 11. pS(en)σS(en) ↑ 1− α when n→∞.
Proof.
pS(en)
σS(en)
= n
(
1− 1
n
)α
− (n− 1) = n
(
1− α
n
− α(1− α)
(2!)n2
− ...
)
− (n− 1)
= (1− α)−
(
α(1− α)
(2!)n
+
α(1− α)(2− α)
(3!)n2
+ ...
)
(B.15)
where the second equality occurs by binomial expansion. So pS(en)/σS(en)
increases in n. It increases to 1− α when n→∞. 
This result gives an impression that the use of linear rebates is unwarranted
to minimize the worst-case objective, because our choice of the worst-case
objective can indeed be driven as close to 0 as we wish, just by choosing
v(a, θ) = θa1−α with α chosen close to 1. We now show that the reduction
in the objective function value occurs because of an increase in σS(θ) at the
Nash equilibrium point, and not due to the reduced surplus.
Proposition 12. Consider θNE = (µNE)en to be the Nash equilibrium
point. Then,
1. pS(θNE) ↑ v′(1/n) as n→∞.
2. σS(θNE) =
v′(1/n)
1−α .
Proof. The Nash equilibrium occurs at the θ satisfying v′i(ai) = v
′(ai, θi)
for all i [16, Cor. 1]. In our case, we have v(a, θ) = θa1−α. Thus the Nash
equilibrium occurs at θ where v′i(ai) = (1 − α)θi/aαi holds for all i. So we
have (θNE)i =
v′i(ai)
1−α a
α
i . When θ = θNE = (µNE)en is a Nash equilibrium
point, we have ai = 1/n for all i, and thus v
′
i(1/n) must be equal for all i.
So µNE =
v′(1/n)
(1−α)nα .
We compute pS(θNE) as
pS(θNE) = (µNE)n
α
(
n
(
1− 1
n
)α
− (n− 1)
)
≤ (µNE)nα(1−α) = v′(1/n)
where the inequality occurs by tracing the same steps in (B.15). The same
steps point that pS(θNE) ↑ v′(1/n) when n→∞.
Now we compute σS(θNE) as
σS(θNE) = µNE
n∑
i=1
(1/n)1−α = nv′(1/n)
(1/n)1−α
(1− α)nα =
v′(1/n)
1− α .
Hence the result. 
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Proposition 12 thus shows that the surplus at θNE approaches a con-
stant, as n→∞, independent of α, but σS(θNE) approaches pS(θNE)/(1−
α). This explains why we scaled our worst-case objective by 1/(1 − α) to
get the normalized plots in Figures 2a and 2b. Varying α changes σS(θ),
but the surplus is quite stable across α. Thankfully, linear rebates return a
significant fraction of the surplus.
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